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Abstract 
 
The advent of the EU-US Open Skies Agreement has been widely 
anticipated. A number of consequences have been predicted, for example, 
impacts on fares, on passenger volumes, choice and on consumer welfare. 
Airline costs are also predicted to fall as a result of increased 
competiveness and increased cooperation among airlines. 
 
In the short period since the implementation of the Agreement, it is relatively 
easy to assess the principal supply-side changes that have been made, but 
more difficult to make wider judgements. For example, can traffic growth be 
attributed to Open Skies and does airline and alliance market power result in 
less fare flexibility with consequently less influence on changes in passenger 
volumes? Have airline costs changed and what has been the source of the 
savings? This paper offers some insight into the data that will be required to 
make these and other wider judgements and discusses some methodological 
difficulties. 
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This paper focuses on the air passenger market and not air cargo, employment or 
environmental effects. 
1.  Introduction 
 
The EU-US Open Skies Agreement has been signed for over a year. The 
expectations of the likely results of such an agreement have been outlined 
in a variety of sources, some of them commissioned by government. It is 
too soon to reach any verdict. Consumer choice has broadened as 
indicated by the supply-side adjustments that have been made. However, 
the particular impact on fares, costs and passengers is of greater interest 
and there is a difficulty of data availability (fares and costs) as well as the 
appropriate choice of methodology to isolate changes due to Open Skies. 
 
 
2.  The EU-US Open Sky Agreement 
 
On the 30
th
 April 2007 EU and US leaders signed the Open Skies 
Agreement at a summit in Washington. This came into force on March 
30
th
 2008 and superseded the individual EU country Open Sky 
Agreements that many EU countries had with the US, commencing with 
the Netherlands in 1992. Table 1 shows the Open Skies bilaterals that 
existed between European countries and the US before the Open Skies 
Agreement with the EU. In May 2008 second stage negotiations were 
launched with an aim of achieving an Open Aviation Area (OAA) by mid-
2010 that will have considerable implications for factor mobility and airline 
ownership if it is achieved. 
 
Table 1: The European Open Skies Bilaterals
1
 
 
Country Date 
Netherlands 14/10/92 
Belgium
2
 1/3/95 
Finland 24/3/95 
Denmark 26/4/95 
Norway 26/4/95 
Sweden 26/4/95 
Luxembourg 6/6/95 
Austria 14/6/95 
Czech Republic 8/12/95 
Germany
3
 29/2/96 
Italy
4
 11/11/98 
Portugal 22/12/99 
Malta 12/10/00 
Poland 31/5/01 
France 19/10/01 
 
1 The full list for the US is at US Department of State (2008c) 
2,3 Provisional 
4 Comity and Reciprocity 
 
Source: Button (2008) 
 
This replacement of the bilateral agreements between the US and EU 
member states, including those that had individual Open Skies 
Agreements, has two key features. 
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 Removal of restrictions on route rights – any EU airline is allowed to 
fly from any EU city to any US city. Conversely, any US airline can 
fly into any EU airport and from there onto third destinations. In 
addition, EU airlines can fly between the US and non-EU countries 
that are members of ECAA, the European Common Aviation Area, 
such as Norway and Croatia. The unequal treatment of cabotage is 
seen as an issue; although US airlines can fly onwards in Europe, 
EU airlines cannot fly domestically in the US
2,3
. 

 Foreign Ownership – the main change here is that US companies 
can now only own 49 percent of the voting rights in European 
Airlines, whereas European Airlines can still hold only 25 percent in 
US airlines, although they can own more in non-voting shares. It is 
the intransigence of the US position here, as well as on cabotage, 
that has led first to a delay in the implementation of the Agreement 
and then the EU‟s right to suspend the Agreement if insufficient 
progress towards a revised Agreement is made by mid-2010. 


4. Reactions and Expectations of Impacts: Politics and Economics  
 
a. British Airways  
 
As 40 percent of all flights from Europe to the US are from 
London Heathrow (LHR), it is obvious that the liberalisation will 
mostly affect this airport and as this is where British Airways 
(BA) is based, it too will be affected. Figure 1 shows total EU-
US traffic since 1995 for comparison.  
 
It is claimed that BA secures 60 percent of its revenues from 
north Atlantic routes
4
 so it is little wonder that it was incensed 
by the Agreement. The BA chief executive, Willie Walsh is 
quoted as describing it as a “poor deal for Europe” and 
continued to point out that,  
 
“ So far the US has made no meaningful concessions. American 
carriers can now fly into Heathrow, Europe and beyond while their 
own backyard remains a no-go area for EU carriers and foreign 
ownership of their airlines remains unchanged. . . . We will hold the 
government to its word to fight for Britain‟s interest if America doesn‟t 
play ball.”
5
   
“With the EU having given away their most valuable negotiating asset 
– Heathrow – the UK government must stand by its pledge to  
 
 
 
 
2 Fifth Freedom Rights are still held to London Heathrow (LHR) and on to the US by, for 
example, Air India (AI), Air New Zealand (NZ) and Kuwait Airways (KU).   
3 Booz Allen Hamilton (2007) think it unlikely that European carriers would operate 
cabotage services in the US after an analysis of London hub activity.  
4
EU-European Information on Transport and Services (2007) at   
http://www.euractiv.com/en/transport/eu-us-open-skies-agreement/article-
167482 
5 
Business Guardian (2007) at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2007/mar/22/europeanunion.theairlineindustry/print 
 
 
3 
withdraw traffic rights if the US does not deliver further 
liberalisation by 2010.”
6
 
 
Figure 1: EU-US Passenger Traffic, 1995-2005. 
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Source: Booz Allen Hamilton (2007) 
 
b. European Commission  
 
The EU Transport Commissioner Jacques Barrot welcomed the 
deal and expressed optimism that EU ambitions for greater 
access to the US market would be fulfilled later thanks to the 
suspension clause. “The EU will have the right to suspend US 
access rights if they drag their feet . . So we will arrive at our 
final goal.”
7
   
“ We want not only to open flights to competition but also 
to open up foreign investment in aviation.”
8
  
 
 
c. US Government  
 
US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, John Byerly played 
down the significance of the EU suspension clause but said that 
the US was committed to the on-going negotiations “in absolute 
good faith and in the spirit of cooperation.”
9
  
 
 
 
 
6 BBC News (2007) at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/6477969.stm   
7 EU-European Information on Transport and Services (2007) at 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/transport/eu-us-open-skies-agreement/article-167482   
8 BBC News (2007) at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/6477969.stm   
9 EU-European Information on Transport and Services (2007) at 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/transport/eu-us-open-skies-agreement/article-167482  
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The Transportation Secretary, Mary Peters, said the deal would 
boost “economic, political, and personal relationships between 
our two continents for years to come.”
10
 
 
 
d.  IACA, ACI Europe 
 
Syviane Lust, Director General of the International Air 
Carrier Association(IACA) said, 
 
“This agreement is a way off the original plans for an Open Aviation 
Area trumpeted four years ago by the European Commission. The 
Commission‟s shopping list for the second-phase negotiations 
remains substantial while the US side has obtained everything it 
wanted in the first phase . . . A deal between the EU and US can only 
be balanced if it results in equal traffic rights for EU and US airlines in 
each other‟s internal markets, identical ownership limits and control 
possibilities, as well as equivalent access to governmental traffic.”
11
 
 
Olivier Jankovec, the Director General of the Airports 
Council International Europe (ACI Europe) said the deal 
would “open new opportunities and bring valuable economic 
benefits for airports around Europe,” but agreed that “we 
must not stop here.”
12
 
 
 
e. Other airlines  
 
Virgin Atlantic (VS), boss Sir Richard Branson, said, “It‟s a good 
day for the traveller as consumers should eventually be able to fly 
from any city to any city between the EU and US, and within these 
countries,” but VS also thought it was unlikely that  
prices could be any lower.   
British Midland International (BD) said the Agreement was 
a “landmark.” ”Millions of travellers will benefit from 
additional competition, including lower fares and a greater 
choice of services.” 
13
  
 
 
f. Brattle Group  
 
The Brattle Group (2002)
14
 reported to the European 
Commission on the expected impacts of an OAA that included 
the removal of foreign ownership and cabotage restrictions as  
 
10 BBC News (2007) at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/6477969.stm   
11 EU-European Information on Transport and Services (2007) at 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/transport/eu-us-open-skies-agreement/article-167482   
12 EU-European Information on Transport and Services (2007) at 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/transport/eu-us-open-skies-agreement/article-167482   
13 BBC News (2007) at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/6477969.stm and BBC 
News (2008) at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/6478651.stm   
14 The Brattle Group report summary and some recent developments are given in Robyn, 
Reitzes and Moselle (2005) where they indicate that the original report was not published 
until 2003, after the European Court of Justice ruling.  
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well as the removal of restrictions on route rights. This was in 
the same year that the European Court of Justice had confirmed 
that the individual bilaterals of Denmark, Sweden, Finland, 
Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria, Germany and the UK infringed 
on the EU‟s external competence and breached single market 
rules. It ordered that a single pact be negotiated and this led to 
the EU-US negotiations which resulted in the Open Skies 
Agreement. 
 
Button (2008) summarises the report and the assumptions 
made, for example, on fare elasticities. In short, consumers 
benefit by about €5.2 billion a year from lower fares, brought 
about by greater competition and increased travel. Additional 
transatlantic passengers would amount to between 4.1 
million and 11.0 million with many more on intra-EU routes 
resulting from network effects adding passengers to arrive at 
totals of 17.7 million to 46.7 million per year. Employment 
impacts are also estimated. 
 
As all cabotage restrictions are lifted in an OAA as well as it 
giving other benefits on investment and factor mobility, 
these estimates provide an upper bound on the likely 
impacts from Open Skies
15
. 
 
 
g. Booz Allen Hamilton  
 
The European Commission asked Booz Allen Hamilton (2007) 
to update the Brattle Group‟s work, so again this represents the 
impact of an OAA with full cabotage rights, although it is 
thought this would be more important for cargo operations. 
Consumers were calculated to benefit between €5.4 and €6.2 
million per year and traffic was expected to grow to totals of 
20.4 to 45.6 million per year from cost reductions, improved 
airline cooperation and the removal of output restrictions on the 
north Atlantic. Passengers resulting from the removal of output 
restrictions on the north Atlantic market alone total 26 million 
over five years with associated consumer surplus of €6.4 to €12 
billion over the period. Again employment impacts were 
calculated and estimated at 72,000 with further jobs in the 
freight sector. These estimates are broadly similar to the Brattle 
Group even though the Booz Allen Hamilton report included the 
cost reductions due to increasing airline efficiency not only 
within the EU, as the Brattle Report did, but also within the US.  
 
It is helpful for understanding to say more about the categories 
used to identify economic benefit and passenger numbers. The 
removal of output restrictions due to the existing bilateral air 
service agreements results in an increase in supply with a 
resulting downward pressure on prices and so stimulates  
 
15 Although the income effects of the price falls are not accounted for.  
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demand and job creation. These effects are estimated for 
the UK, Ireland, Greece, Spain and Hungary, countries 
without Open Skies Agreements with the US, where in 2004 
the UK accounted for 39.5 percent of total EU-US traffic with 
the remaining four countries at 4 percent. Economic growth 
is stimulated and consumer choice is broadened. 
 
Increased competition reduces the relative market power of 
airlines and may facilitate closer alliances that allow coordination 
of prices and schedules to reduce costs and so fares. This 
improved airline cooperation is estimated to raise consumer 
surplus by €160 million to €340 million per year with price 
decreases varying between 18 and 28 percent and different 
price elasticity values of unity and 2.5 respectively. However, it 
is also possible that stronger alliances will weaken the beneficial 
price and choice impacts on consumers. 
 
The final category is that of reductions in individual airlines‟ 
costs. The increased competition gives airlines the incentive to 
lower costs to remain competitive. This downward pressure on 
costs goes beyond the north Atlantic and impacts EU and US 
markets. Airlines are estimated to reduce operating costs by 1 
to 3 percent and this could lead to lower fares and more 
demand again. 
 
The main results of the Brattle Group and the Booz Allen 
Hamilton Report are summarised in Table 2. 
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Table 2: The Impact on Passengers and Consumer 
Benefit of an Open Aviation Area between the EU-US. 
 
 
  Brattle Group  Booz Allen 
    Hamilton 
  PASSENGERS Per year (‘000s)  
 lower upper lower upper 
Cost Savings 968 3,169 15,000 39,000 
Airline 975 5,654 240 1,400 
Cooperation     
Removal of 2,188 2,188 5,200 5,200 
Output     
Restrictions     
Cost Savings 13,527 35,720 8,400
1
 22,000
1
 
intra EU     
TOTAL 17,658 46,731 20,440 45,600 
  CONSUMER Per year (‘000s)  
  SURPLUS  
 lower upper lower upper 
Cost Savings 662 778 3,700 3,800 
Airline 629 1,347 160 340 
Cooperation     
Removal of 1,469 605 2,400 1,280 
Output     
Restrictions     
Cost Savings 2,351 2,483 2,200
1
 2,300
1
 
intra EU     
TOTAL 5,111 5,213 6,260 5,420 
 
1.     Included in Cost Savings row 
 
Source: Compiled from Brattle Group (2002) and Booz Allen 
Hamilton (2007). 
 
 
4. Actual Impacts  
 
a.  Supply Side  
 
i.   LHR 
 
As so much of the total north Atlantic traffic is with the UK 
and is newly subject to the removal of route right 
restrictions it is clear that UK airports should be the major 
focus of attention. A preliminary examination of OAG data 
concentrating on services between London and New York 
and comparing August 2007 with August 2008 reveals the 
movement of New York flights from London Gatwick (LGW) 
to LHR. The overall picture also shows the demise of the 
business low-cost airlines, MaxJet, Zoom and Silverjet. It is 
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much clearer, however, if activity at LHR is focussed on as 
in August 2007, American Airlines (AA) was offering LHR 
service in addition to BA and Virgin (VS) and a year later 
was joined by Delta (DL) and Continental (CO). 
 
Button (2008) summarises the number of return flights 
between LHR and all US destinations as do Morrell and 
Humphreys (2008) between June 2008 and June 2007. 
The changes indicate greater consumer choice. Morrell 
and Humphreys (2008) also point out that BA has moved 
services from LGW
16
 and that Air France (AF) has 
introduced a daily service to Los Angeles. Table 3 shows 
the changes in seats offered and scheduled flights between 
June 2007 and 2008. 
 
Table 3: Changes in Seats and Flights 
offered, LHR –US, June 2007 - 2008. 
Airline Seats per month Flights per month 
British Airways 29,457 104 
Continental Airlines 27,420 120 
Northwest Airlines 24,927 89 
Delta Airlines 19,260 90 
American Airlines 13,172 56 
US Airways 7,980 30 
Air France 7,500 30 
United Airlines 5,010 30 
Air New Zealand 198 0 
Kuwait Airways -237 -1 
Virgin Atlantic Airways -5,003 0 
Air India -5,160 0 
TOTAL 124,524 548 
Source: Morrell and Humphreys (2008)  
 
 
Given that LHR is slot-constrained, these changes may be 
more limited than if there was not such a constraint and 
the relative scarcity is indicated by the price at which slots 
are traded. Button (2008) notes that CO paid $209 million 
for four LHR slots and Cole (2008) describes the source of 
the Open Skies slots at LHR and this is summarised in 
Table 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16 
BA started a JFK service of 7 per week from LGW at the end of October 2008 perhaps 
taking advantage of the movement to LHR of US airlines. 
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Table 4: Sources of Open Skies slots 
 
Airline Slots 
 
 
Air France Reduced Paris from 12 to 7  
per day:  
3 to DL, 1 CO, 1 AF to Los  
Angeles (LAX) 
KLM Dropped 2 to Eindhoven  
(EIN) and reduced Rotterdam  
(RTM) by 1:  
Funded Northwest‟s (NW)  
Detroit (DET), Minneapolis 
(MSP), Seattle (SEA) Service  
as Skyteam partner  
Alitalia Dropped 3 at Milan Malpensa  
(MXP) as part of strategic  
retrenchment: 1 to CO, 1 to  
US Airways (US) and 1 BA  
GB Airways Sold LHR slots: 2 to CO, 1 to  
BA, 1 to Qatar Airways (QR) 
Iberia Dropped 1 to Bilbao (BIO): 
Funded 2
nd
  AA Dallas (DFW) 
move to LHR from LGW 
 
Source: Cole (2008) 
 
 
Some airlines‟ plans to inaugurate LHR service have 
materialised through this slot trading within alliances, for 
example, NW and US. But BD has postponed its entry to 
LHR until at least 2009, despite its constant enthusiasm for 
inaugurating north Atlantic routes and the number of slots 
it retains at LHR
17
. Cole (2008) also shows the difference 
in the slot provision at LHR between 2007 and 2008 where 
the greater variety of choice for consumers is plain. Figure 
2 reproduces his pie chart and it is clear that US carriers 
previously denied access to LHR have moved there. 
Figure 3 details where these slots are serving in the US. 
More recently, CO announced palns to serve LHR from 
Cleveland from May 2009, replacing a similar service from 
LGW1. 
 
 
 
 
 
17 
Travel Trade Gazette (2007) 
http://www.ttglive.com/c/portal/layout?p_l_id=61139&CMPI_SHARED_articleId=247190&CM 
PI_SHARED_ImageArticleId=247190&CMPI_SHARED_articleIdRelated=247190&CMPI_SH 
ARED_ToolsArticleId=247190&CMPI_SHARED_CommentArticleId=247190&articleTitle=BMI 
%20Postpones%20US%20Plans&fromSearch=yes
                                                 
1
 Air Transport News(2008) at http://www.airtransportnews.aero/print_article.pl?id=15164 
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Figure 2: LHR - US: Airline Slot Shares, 2007 - 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Cole (2008) 
 
 
Figure 3: LHR - US: US Airports Served by 
Airline and Daily Frequency, 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Cole (2008) 
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ii.   Other Airports 
 
As well as VS intending to start services from continental 
European cities in 2010
18
, Ryanair announced plans to fly 
the north Atlantic in the same year to serve a variety of US 
destinations including New York and Boston using secondary 
airports such as Long Island Islip (ISP) or Stewart (SWF) and 
Providence, Rhode Island (PVD) or Manchester, New 
Hampshire (MHT)
19
. But the most radical departure that has 
been implemented is BA‟s launch of a  
new airline, OpenSkies (EC) initially connecting Paris Orly 
(ORY) with New York John F. Kennedy Airport (JFK).
20,21
 
 
In August 2008, service was seven flights per week (OAG, 
2008) and the contemplated service from Brussels (BRU) 
had not been implemented as it was reported that the 
Boeing 757-200 from the BA fleet had not been 
reconfigured in the 82 seat EC layout. There are plans to 
add other European cities and Amsterdam (AMS) started 
before the contemplated BRU service in October with six 
flights per week to JFK. It is also intended to add Frankfurt 
(FRA) and Milan (MXP) by the end of 2009
22
. Figure 4 
shows the proposed livery. BA management expected 70 
percent of passengers to come from the US at ORY. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 
Port of Seattle (2007) at http://www.portseattle.org/news/press/2007/12_10_2007_10.shtml 
and US Airways (2007) at 
http://www.usairways.com/awa/content/aboutus/pressroom/pressreleases.aspx, Travel Weekly 
(2008) at http://www.travelweekly.co.uk/Articles/2008/03/04/26858/virgin-atlantic-rules-out-
continental-europe-to-us-service-until.html  
19 
Irish Independent (2007) at http://www.independent.ie/national-news/oleary-plans-new-
allfrills-airline-for-flights-to-us-43198.html  
20 
Times Online (2008) at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/travel/business/article3160337.ece 21 
It managed to acquire slots at ORY by forging a code-share with the all business class carrier, 
L‟Avion (AO).  
22 
Executive Travel (2008) at 
http://www.executivetravelmagazine.com/page/BA's+OpenSkies+cleared+for+Paris+flights?t= 
anon 
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Figure 4: The Livery of OpenSkies, the BA subsidiary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Times Online (2008) 
 
 
iii.Virgin America 
 
The most notable change that has resulted from the, in fact 
effectively hardly changed, ownership features of the 
Agreement is the foundation of Virgin America (VX) which 
began operating in August 2007 providing long haul point 
to point services between major metropolitan cities on the 
eastern and western seaboards. At present the airports 
served are LAX, San Diego (SAN), San Francisco (SFO), 
Las Vegas (LAS), JFK, Washington DC, Dulles (IAD) and 
SEA
23
. VS holds a 23 percent stake which is consistent 
with the ownership rules (Button, 2008) and the delay in its 
start up owes much to the doubts over whether VX was a 
US airline. Figure 5 shows Virgin America aircraft at JFK. 
 
 
Figure 5: Virgin America Livery 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23  
Virgin America (2008) at http://www.virginamerica.com/va/home.do 
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b. Demonstration Effects  
 
The success of the initial Open Skies Agreements between the 
US and individual European countries as well as the 
subsequent EU-US Agreement has had a demonstration effect 
that has resulted in other agreements being considered or 
implemented in other parts of the world. This includes between 
the US and a variety of countries, for example, Australia in 2008 
(US Department of State, 2008a, Button, 2008) and Brunei, 
Chile, New Zealand and Singapore in 2001 (US Department of 
State, 2008b) as well as between the EU and Canada in late 
2008.
24
 Other US Agreements are listed at US Department of 
State (2008c). Singapore has also signed an agreement with 
the Czech Republic2. 
 
The ASEAN Open Skies Agreement (Forsyth, King and Rodolfo, 
2006) is between ten countries in south east Asia and there is 
pressure to expand the membership to include major Asian 
countries such as India, that already has a US Agreement, and 
China
25
. It is not hard to imagine ASEAN collectively having 
Agreements with the EU and US. This in turn has prompted 
other Asian countries, such as Japan to consider similar 
initiatives. Indeed, Japan aims to have an agreement with 
ASEAN. It is also easy to contemplate initiatives that result in 
greater liberalisation and openness in South America and 
Africa. These could build on the existing US Agreements which 
include Uruguay, Paraguay and Peru in south America and 
Nigeria, Gambia, Kenya, Ghana, Tanzania, Uganda, Mali, 
Cameroon, Chad and Liberia in Africa.  
 
 
5. Research Needs: Data and Methods  
 
It is evident from the economic analyses of the Brattle Group (2002) and 
Booz Allen Hamilton (2007) that data on passengers, fares and airline 
costs is required to assess the impact of the Open Skies Agreement along 
with data or assumptions on price elasticities. Each of these factors are 
discussed below. 
 
a. Passengers  
 
There is very good data on passenger numbers on the north 
Atlantic. The UK CAA (2008) has data by UK city and airport to 
US cities and airports online from 1997. The lowest level of 
temporal aggregation is by month from 1998. The US Bureau of  
 
 
24 Air Transport News (2008) at   
http://www.airtransportnews.aero/article.pl?mcateg=&id=14923
25
 
AsiaOne News (2007) at  
http://www.asiaone.com/News/AsiaOne+News/Singapore/Story/A1Story20071101-
33686.html 
                                                 
2
 Air Transport News (2009) at http://www.airtransportnews.aero/article.pl?mtcateg=&id=15433 
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Transportation Statistics (hereafter, US BTS, 2008a) has similar 
data online from 1990 which includes information on frequency 
of service, airline and aircraft type for which, in the UK case, 
data from the OAG (2008) must be sought. If this monthly data 
can be tied to fare changes, estimates of arc elasticity could be 
derived. Point elasticity would require an econometric estimation 
of a demand function using continuous data. 
 
 
b. Fares  
 
Airline web sites can provide data on fares that are offered and 
this has been the bases of some work analysing fare variation 
and correlation for low cost carriers in Pitfield (2005a, 2005b). 
However, these same web sites, although they can show the 
variation in fares over time prior to departure, have the 
disadvantage that the link to passenger demand is only implicit. 
That is, the fares increase as the aircraft fills up. Consequently, 
estimates of price elasticity would be difficult to derive, not 
least, because there are a variety of fare types offered by 
legacy carriers and associating these fares with segments of 
demand would face added data difficulties. Airlines might only 
be aware of the yield per flight and, after all, this is what they 
are managing.  
 
The US BTS (2008b) provides a quarterly 10 percent sample of 
tickets that shows what passengers actually paid but this is 
only available for the US domestic market. A government 
initiative would be required to extend this sample to the north 
Atlantic. Without such an initiative, recourse would be to airline 
data, given cooperation and the fact that the data is recorded 
and stored, or a survey of passengers, which might require 
industry support. Appropriate fare data is difficult to obtain 
although an indication may be gained by using passenger 
numbers and estimates of revenue from US BTS data, that is, a 
yield. This average for each airline can be derived for each 
year or quarter and is the basis of some elasticity estimates.  
 
 
c. Airline Costs  
 
Changes in costs are taken to arise from increased competition 
between airlines as well as from closer alliances and cooperation. 
Airline financial data is available in company accounts and this 
may give sufficient detailed insight into operating costs. Case 
studies and cross sectional studies might be able to yield further 
insights and econometric estimation might fill gaps in knowledge. 
As such disaggregate data is commercially sensitive so good 
information may be hard to achieve. The US Bureau of 
Transportation Statistics (US BTS, 2008c) provides annual and 
quarterly profit and loss statement  
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data, including operating costs with a reasonable degree of 
disaggregation, but only for large US carriers with operating 
revenues above $20 million per annum. Categories identified 
are maintenance, flying operations, promotion and sales and 
passenger service. The UK CAA (2006) provides annual profit 
and loss account details for individual airlines where total 
operating costs can be disaggregated into some 27 items 
including maintenance, flight crew and cabin crew salaries, 
passenger services and station costs, where the latter might 
benefit from airline cooperation. There is a difference in the 
periodicity of these cost data as well as a potential difference 
with fare and passenger data. 
 
 
d. Elasticities  
 
Elasticities can be assumed as they were in the Brattle Group 
(2008) and Booz Allen and Hamilton (2007) studies or 
calculated. Simple arc elasticity calculations require percentage 
changes in fares and the associated changes in passengers 
whilst point elasticity calculations require continuous data and 
an appropriate econometric estimation of a demand function. 
The issue here, as indicated above, is not the methods, but the 
data.  
 
 
e. Consumer Surplus  
 
To replicate the consumer surplus results as reported in the 
Brattle Group(2002) and Booz Allen and Hamilton (2007) 
studies
26
 requires estimates of changes in passengers 
attributable to the Agreement. To convert these to surpluses 
simply requires assumptions on elasticities and data on fares. 
These assumptions could be repeated as well as the calculation 
relating passengers to operating revenues to derive fare 
estimates, albeit only for quarters at best.  
 
 
6.  Dealing with the Counterfactual 
 
The counterfactual was a key feature of work in econometric history in the 
1960‟s. Fogel (1964) and Fishlow(1965) provide seminal treatments and 
(McAfee, 1983) provides a humorous but nevertheless pertinent 
illustration of the approach. Blunk et al (2006) provide a recent illustration 
applied to 9/11. 
 
Applied to the Open Skies Agreement, in essence, the approach would 
say that if the effect of the Agreement is to be correctly identified, we need 
to know what passengers, fares and costs would have been had the Open 
Skies Agreement not been signed and implemented. This is the 
 
26 
Appendix 3 contains the details of surplus calculation. 
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counterfactual. The observed changes in passengers, fares and costs, 
where they can be observed, are then corrected for this counterfactual 
position to yield the residual impact of the Agreement. The correct 
degree of causation of the Open Skies Agreement is identified. 
 
This issue is clearly a major difficulty for this research agenda. It is not 
correct to attribute changes in variables after Open Skies to Open Skies. 
It is necessary to know what would have been the situation without the 
Agreement. What would passengers, fares and costs have been? 
 
Pitfield (2007) has produced some work on airline alliances which is 
pertinent to this topic, in particular, because the growth of alliances might 
well temper the impact on fare reductions from competition and so traffic 
growth, although alliances may also result in fare reductions from airline 
cooperation as costs fall. The question that this paper specifically dealt 
with was, whether it is possible to identify the change in alliance market 
share and passengers on a route as a result of code sharing and the 
signing of the individual European Open Skies Agreements with the US. 
Iatrou and Alamdari (2005) had suggested from survey work that airline 
expectations were positive, yet Pitfield (2007) found no specific impact on 
passenger numbers or alliance shares, using time series analysis and 
intervention analysis, beyond the changes that resulted from changes in 
fares, aircraft types and frequencies that the airlines had made on these 
routes continually since 1990. That is, this estimate of the counterfactual 
suggested that the alliances had no further impact. 
 
This time series analysis might be a way of dealing with recorded 
changes in passenger data to isolate that due to the Agreement as this 
data exists. The sparsity of other data might be as big a handicap in the 
case of fares and costs, although if this desideratum is met the issue of 
causality still remains. 
 
 
7.  Conclusion 
 
This paper has detailed the main features of the EU-US Open Skies 
Agreement and has summarised both the political reactions to the 
Agreement as well as the reasoned economic analysis of the expected 
outcomes. The effects that can be identified to date consisted of changes 
in airline service offerings, particularly at LHR, and demonstration effects. 
The paper concluded with an analysis of the data and methodological 
requirements of an assessment of the impact of the Agreement. 
 
It can be concluded that to assess the impact requires overcoming 
difficulties in data collection on fares and costs, whilst on passengers, 
it needs to be determined what proportion of change is attributable to 
the Agreement. This raises methodological issues. 
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